Risk management strategy based on price swap for generation companies in electricity market environment by Li, XJ et al.
          
????: 2008-08-25
????:??? ( 1979- ) ,?,??,???????????????????????.
????:???,?,??,???; E-m ai:l eehw ngan@ po lyu. edu. hk
? 23?? 3?
2008? 9?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
JOURNAL OF EIECTR IC POWER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY




李晓军 1, 2, 颜汉荣 2, 余志伟 2, 钟志勇 2, 黄杰波 2, 谭忠富 1
( 1.?????? ???????,?? ??  102206; 2.?????? ?????, ?? ?? )
?  ?:???????????????????, ??????????,??????????; ????




?  ?  ?:????, ????, ????,????
?????: TM 73; F 123. 9   ?????: A   ????: 1673-9140( 2008) 03-0012-06
R isk managem ent strategy based on price swap for generation
companies in electricitym arket environm ent
LI X iao- jun
1, 2
, H. W. Ngan
2
, C. W. Yu
2
, C. Y. Chung
2
, K. P. W ong
2
, TAN Zhong- fu
1
( 1. In stitu te of E lectricity E conom ics, North C h ina E lectric Pow er Un iversity, B eijing 102206, Ch ina;
2. Departm en t of E lect rical Engineering, The H ong K ong Po lytechn ic Un ivers ity, H ong Kong, Ch in a)
Abstract: E lectricity spotmarket is one of the commoditymarkets hav ing high price vo latility, w hichm ay
expose participants to various types of risk. Sub ject to d ifferent risk preference and comparat ive advan-
tage, partic ipants canmake use of pow er price sw ap as an effective too l to hedge the pow er price vo latility
risk. Th is paper presents a pow er price sw ap risk-hedg ing model based on sw ap too l in f inance market
and utility theory. It expla ins how the price sw ap can be used to hedge risk in open e lectricity marke.t
Examp le of analysis is included to show the effect o f the sw ap-based too l in cases of h igh price vo latility
market and different risk-taking pro file o f the utilities.
Key words: e lectricity marke;t price vo latility; sw ap too;l riskm anagemen t
1 Introduction
E lectric ity market re form invo lves unbund ling the
vertically integrated electric ity industry and in troduces
competit ion into themarket operation. Generation com-
pan ies ge t theirmarket share by open bidd ing and cus-
tom ers can opt to choose their serv ice prov iders. As e-
lectricity is a un ique commodity fo r it cannot be stored,
spot balance betw een genera tion and consumption has
to bem ainta ined. Its operat ion can be regarded as risk
due to exposure of h igh price vo latility of the electricity
commod ity and financ ia l risk assoc iated w ith the capital
investmen.t R isk management such as by making use
of forw ard, future, and opt ion contracts is common ly
used to safeguard interests of the market partic ipants.
In re ferences [ 1~ 4] , generation companiesmanage to
build stochastic opt im ization mode,l deve lop opt imal
investment portfo lio and perfo rm a ll k inds of statistical
analysis for ach iev ing the ir b idding objectives. Wh ile
in [ 5~ 7], they derive a m echan ism fo r allocat ing
the ir pow er generation capacity betw een spot m arket
and contractmarke.t
Sw ap too l is often referred as a kind o f risk man-
ag ing too l in the f inancemarke ts. Participan ts agree to
exchange the ir currency kind, ra te basis and other f-i
nancia l asset during a period. The basis of swap relies
on comparative benefit of part ic ipants in carry ing out
the sw ap activ ity [ 8] . For examp le, Company A has
comparative advantage of hav ing fixed rate to get cap-
ital w hile Company Bps comparative advantage is on
var iab le rate. If they have opposite demand, C ompany
A and B can decrease the ir capital cost by using the
rate sw ap. In the electricity marke,t partic ipants may
have d ifferent risk preference, wh ich means different
participants bear different pow er price volat ility risk.
R isk-aversion part icipants w ou ld like a f ixed pow er
pr ice and risk-preference participants w ish variab le
pr ice. H ence, they can come up w ith some sort of
pr ice swap contract to hedge the pow er price vo latility
risk. It d iffers from the tradit iona l long term con tract
because the ent ire pow er quantity and m arke-t clearing
pr ice do no t change after the pow er pr ice sw ap, on ly
the sett lement prices of participants tak ing part in sw ap
change. Partic ipant initially hav ing fixed price may
have var iab le settlement price after sw ap. Pow er price
sw ap can bene fit sw ap partic ipants, so after sw ap
partic ipantsputilityw ill increase and risk w ill decrease.
The remainder of th is paper is arranged as fo-l
low s. Section 2 brief ly describes utility theory and risk
att itude. The utility function o f a generation company
in e lectricity m arket is discussed in Section 3. The
pow er price sw ap hedg ing-risk mode l is presented in
Section 4. S imulation resu lt is shown in section 5.
Section 6 concludes th is paper.
2 Expected Utility Theory and R isk
A ttitude
  Expected U tility Theory states tha t the decision
maker chooses betw een risky prospects by comparing
the ir expected u tility va lues, .i e. the w eighted sums
obtained by add ing the ut ility va lues o f outcomesmult-i
plied by the ir respect ive probabilit ies. U tility values
are judged asmerit of carrying out the dec ided activity
and they depend much on the decision m akersp yard-
stick. H ence utility value can be used to m easure
partic ipantps subjective value attitude or preference for
some dec ision [ 9] .
According to the investm ent portfo lio theory, the
U tility Function ( U) of a part icipant is def ined as fo-l
low s:
U = E (R ) - 5R (R ) . ( 1)
Where, E (R ) is the participantps expectat ion of return;
R(R ) is standard dev iat ion o f re turn; 5 is risk attitude,
-0. means risk-preference, -0. 5. means r isk-neu tra l
and -1. means risk-aversion. So 5R( R ) can be seen
as the risk born by partic ipan.t
3 U tility Function of Generation Co-
mpanies in E lectricityM arkets
  Generation compan ies can participate by entering
the contractmarket and spotmarke.t In this paper, w e
assume that the generation company attends on ly one
market for simp licity of considerat ion.
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By using the fo llow ing no tations:
p : M arket c learing price
q : Pow er quantity
C : Cost funct ion of pow er generat ion
A : A generation company on spotmarket
B : A generation company on contractmarket
c, d : Un it production cost coeffic ients
The generat ion cost has a re lationsh ip w ith pow er
quant ity, C ( q ) can be def ined as fo llow s:





+ dq . (2)
Then the respective return functions of A and B are:
RA = qA pA - CA ( qA ) ; (3)
RB = qBpB - CB ( qB ) . (4)
From equat ions ( 1), ( 3) and ( 4), w e can obtain the
utility functions of A and B as fo llow s:
UA = qAE ( pA ) - CA ( qA ) - 5A qA R (pA ) ; (5)
UB = qBE (pB ) - CB ( qB ) - 5B qB R ( pA ) . (6)
4 Power Price Swap Hedging-risk
M odel
  E lectric ity transaction risk ex istsm ainly due to the
pow er price vo la tility in the spotmarke.t A lthough par-
t icipants can hedge the risk through the contractm arket
by fix ing the sett lem ent price be forehand, they lose the
marke t opportun ity to buy or se ll electricity w ith mo re
appropriate price in the spot marke.t H ence, one con-
cern is how to draw a ba lance in the hedg ing process
by apport ioning the pow er transaction in be tw een the
tw o markets [ 10, 11] . Pow er price sw ap is considered
a w ay out to solve th is problem by m aking use o f the
comparative advantage of the partic ipants. Both A and
B are benefited by arb itrating the ir risk preference as A
is mo re risk-aversion and prefers fixed settlement price
w hile B ismore risk- tak ing and prefer to takemore risk
formore pro fi.t
In respect o f the h igh risk associated w ith the
pr ice vo latility in the spotm arke,t partic ipants w an t to
hedge the risk and max im ize their pro fi.t A is risk-a-
version and hates volat ile pr ice, .i e. 0. 5 < 5A < 1. B
is risk-preference and w ishes vo latile price, 0 < 5B <
0. 5. Due to that the risk att itude ofA and B are oppo-
site, they can use price sw ap to obtain the ir goa.l
S ince the utility funct ion of the generation companies
relates to both pow er price and risk att itude, the price
sw apmust be ab le to sat isfy the risk enduring capabil-i
ty o f the generat ion companies as w el.l
In the paper, w e assume that each generat ion com-
pany enters only one marketmode at a t ime and hence
it has d ifferen t type of r isk exposure. As A enters the
spo tmarket that has variab le settlement pow er price, it
expects to sw ap w ith B to get a fixed price dea.l B
trades in the contract m arke,t and has no invo lvement
in the spo tmarke.t Hence B w ants to make use o f var-i
ab le price to sell pow er bu t not to endure too much
risk. A and B sw ap the ir pow er pr ice as illustrated in
F igure 1. A fter the pow er price sw ap, Aps settlement
price becomes fixed price and that for B is variab le.
? 1 发电公司 A和 B之间的电价互换交易过程
Figure 1 Pow er pr ice sw ap between A and B
The settlemen t pow er price o fA a fter the sw ap is
p
c
A = (pB - b) + pA - (pA + a ) = pB - ( a + b ).
( 7)
and the settlement pow er price o f B after the sw ap is
p
c
B = ( pA + a ) + pB - ( pB - b ) = pA + ( a + b ) .
( 8)
Where, a and b deno te the swap price constants deter-
m ined by part ic ipantspnego tiation.
As( pB - ( a + b ) ) + ( pA + ( a + b ) ) = pA + pB,
e lectricity customers w ill no t pay more for their e lec-
tr ic ity. But for generation companies they get their goa l
and decrease the risk.
A fter the pow er price sw ap, the settlement price
o fA and B are converted into fixed price and variable
price respect ive ly. Their market transaction positions
are v irtually exchanged and the assoc iated transaction
risks are also sw apped. But the pow er price sw ap is not
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just the simp le exchange betw een contract price and
spot price. By comparing the fixed price p
c
A of A w ith
the orig inal fixed pricepB , the pr ice is reduced by ( a
+ b) . F rom th is view po int of analysis, althoughA gets
the fixed price dea,l it still bears part of the price vo la-
t ility r isk. Sim ilarly, by comparing w ithpA , the varia-
b le pricep
c
B of B increase by ( a + b) . It means com-
pared w ith A the price volat ility risk of B in the spot
marke t is reduced by ( a + b ) .
The ut ilities o fA and B after the pow er price swap
are
UcA = qAE (pB - ( a + b) ) - CA ( qA ) -
5A qA R( pB - ( a + b ) ) ; (9)
UcB = qBE ( pA + ( a + b) ) - CB ( qB ) -
5B qB R (pA + ( a + b ) ) . (10)
  Ow ing to tha t the sw ap is a kind o f transact ion
benefiting partic ipants, the utilities ofA and B w ill in-
crease.
So
UcA - UA > 0 ; (11)
UcB - UB > 0. (12)
  From equation ( 5) , ( 9) and( 6 ), ( 10) , w e can
get
qAE (pB - ( a + b ) ) - CA ( qA ) -
5A qA R ( pB - ( a + b ) ) - qAE (pA ) +
CA ( qA ) + 5A qA R( pA ) > 0 ; (13)
qBE (pA + ( a + b ) ) - CB ( qB ) -
5B qB R( pA + ( a + b) ) - qBE ( pB ) +
CB ( qB ) + 5B qB R (pB ) > 0 . (14)
  A spB denotes the contract price de term ined in ad-
vance, pB can be taken as a constan.t ThenE (pB ) =
pB, D (pB ) = 0. Dur ing the contract transact ion
process, participants nego tiate for a contract price
based on the forecast of spo t price, sow e can takepB =
E (pA ). Simplify ing equation( 13) and( 14) as fo llow s
5A qA R( pA ) - qA ( a + b ) > 0 ; (15)
qB ( a + b) - 5B qB R ( pA ) > 0. (16)
  So from equat ion ( 15) and ( 16), w e can ca lcu-
late the range o f sw ap price a + b determ ined by
participantspnegotiation.
5B R (pA ) < a + b < 5A R ( pA ) . (17)
  Based on the princ ip le of sharing risk and ga ins
together, A and B should get equa l u tility increm enta l
value after the sw ap.
H ence,
UcA - UA = UcB - UB.
then ca lculat ing w ith equation ( 15) and ( 16), w e can
get the optima l sw ap pr ice
( a + b ) =
R (pA ) ( 5A qA + 5BqB )
qa + qB
. ( 18)
  From equation ( 18) , w e can see that the optima l
sw ap price depends on the spo t pow er price volat ility,
risk a tt itude and pow er quantity. As shown from equa-
tions ( 17) and ( 18), if R( pA ) = 0, ( a + b) wou ld
no t be greater and less than zero at the same t ime imp-l
y ing that the pow er price cou ld no t be w orked ou.t If
R( pA ) = 0 itmeans that the spot pow er pricew ou ld be
held constant and themarket is not risky.
5 Analysis of Simulation
Assume that A sw aps w ith B to hedge the pow er
price volatility risk as exp lained in the Section 4. The
unit production cost coefficients and output lmi its are
listed in Table 1. The contract price of B is 28. 356
St /MWh, and spot price pA is a stochastic variable
meeting w ith normal distribut ion of E (p ) = 28. 356,
R(p ) is 14. 354, 8. 652, 3. 214 and 0 respective ly. The
smi u lation results are obtained and listed in Table 2~ 4.
1) From the resu lt 1 of Table 1~ 4, w ith the in-
creasing o fmarket risk, that is R (p ) increase, A and
B get mo re utility value from the power price sw ap;
and when the spot pow er price keep constan,t R( p ) =
0, the incremental ut ility va lue o fA and B is zero as
show n in Table 5. It show s when the pow er price fluc-
tuatemore severely in the electric itym arke,t the pow er
price swap w ill play more significant ro le in hedg ing
the risk.
? 1 机组生产成本系数和出力限制
Tab le 1 Unit production cost coeffic ients and output lim its
G i ci d i P i, m in /MW P i, m ax /MW
A 0. 1218 13. 6440 30 160
B 0. 1086 13. 4928 40 120
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? 2 R ( p ) = 14. 354时发电公司的互换电力价格
Tab le 2 R ( p ) = 14. 354, pow er price sw ap
of gene ration compan ies

















































? 3 R ( p ) = 8. 652时发电公司的互换电力价格
Table 3 R ( p ) = 8. 652, pow er pr ice sw ap
of genera tion compan ies

















































? 4 R ( p ) = 3. 214时发电公司的互换电力价格
Tab le 4 R ( p ) = 3. 214, pow er price swap
of gene ration compan ies

















































? 5 R ( p ) = 0时发电公司的互换电力价格
Tab le 5 R ( p ) = 0, powe r price sw ap
of genera tion compan ies

















































  2) The resu lt in Tab le 2 show s how the different
risk attitude of genera tion companies produces different
incrementa l utility value in the pow er pr ice sw ap. W ith
5A - 5B reduc ing, the increm enta lu tility value from the
pow er price sw ap also reduces. Itm eans the compara-
t ive advantage ( risk att itude) betw een participants a-f
fect the ut ility value. M ore opposite risk pre ference a-t
t itudew ill getmore ut ility value out of the pow er price
sw ap. A s seen from the resu lt 4 in Table. 1~ 4, the
generat ion company canno t getmore utility va lue out of
the risk hedg ing process. Hence, absence of compara-
t ive advan tagew ill reduce the u tility function of genera-
t ion companies a fter the pow er price sw ap.
3) R esult 1 in Table. 1 ~ 4 te lls us tha t partic-i
pants need more sw ap pow er price when the pow er
price vo latility risk becomes higher. By analyzing the
result 1, when spo t price vo la tilityR (p ) = 14. 354, A
and B need to set the sw ap pow er price: ( a + b ) =
8. 455 to obtain equa l utility value. H ere, the sw ap
pow er pr ice ( a + b ) can be any value betw een
( 0. 014 354, 14. 081 274) . A fter calcu lating the util-i
ty values w ith different sw ap pow er price, w e can ob-
ta in d ifferent incrementa l utility va lues show n in Figure
2. W ith the increasing o f sw ap pow er price ( a + b),
the f ixed settlement pricep
c
A = pB - ( a + b ) decreases
andA obta ins less utility value from the sw ap and en-
duresmore risk. B gets more ut ility value by enduring
less risk w ith the increasing o f the sw ap pow er price
( a + b ) . Only at the po int( 8. 455, 675. 212 ), they
get equal utility va lue.
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? 2 当 R ( p ) = 14. 354时, 价格互换后
发电公司的 ( a + b )和 $U值
F igure 2 W hen R ( p ) = 14. 354, ( a + b ) and$U of
generation com pan ies after pr ice sw ap
6 Conlusion
Severe fluctuation o f the pow er price in the spot
marke t contributes to the pow er price volat ility risk as
expla ined in the paper. It causes losses to generat ion
companies, reta ilers and customers and dam ages the
stable operat ion of the e lectricity marke.t U sing long-
term contract can be an effective too l to stab ilize the
pow er price and hedge the spo t price risk fo r partic-i
pants in the e lectric ity m arke.t A s illustrated in the
simulation analysis, w hen the risk-aversion partic ipant
chooses contractm arket to trade, he may loss opportu-
n ity benefits out of the spot marke;t v ice versa, risk-
preference participant trad ing in the spo t market may
not be ab le to hedge risk through the contractm arket if
he only enters the spotm arke.t M ak ing use o f bo th the
spot and con tractmarkets appear a log icalw ay out but
it needs a thoughtfu l strategy to apportion the pow er
quant ity into the tw o markets. Seeing that the pow er
pr ice needs not be considered in th is problem, and
natura l ex istence o f different risk attitudes o f partic-i
pants, the pow er price sw ap is justified to be feasib le
for hedg ing the risk exposure in bo th the spot and con-
tractmarkets for various m arket part icipants includ ing
generat ion companies, reta ilers and consumers. In the
execution o f the price sw ap, the follow ing observat ion
are no ted:
1) The larger the scale of the pow er pr ice fluctu-
ation, the higher o f the utility va lue can be effected;
2) The pow er price sw apping functions on ly w ith
partic ipants of opposite risk- tak ing attitude;
3) S imulation resu lt show s that the pow er price
sw ap is a gam ing process. Its success re lies on part ic-i
pants obta in ing equal ut ility value out o f the risk-hedg-
ing process.
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